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Worksharing is more common in western Europe than in North America, but it has been receiving increasing attention hère.
1 In Canada, this is partially because of récent changes in fédéral législation providing greater incentives for employers and employées to enter worksharing arrangements.
Layoffs rather than worksharing hâve been the usual response to decreases in levels of économie activity because layoffs compromise neither union emphasis on seniority nor the préoccupation of employers with their right to allocate workers to jobs. As well, labour législation has been designed generally to accommodate layoffs, and inadvertently may hâve discouraged alternatives like worksharing. For example, most législation provides for severance pay and advance notice in case of layoff, but makes no mention of suitable worksharing arrangements.
Worksharing can be simply defined as a réduction in hours worked; in the absence of an équivalent increase in productivity, it has the effect of expanding employment opportunities at a constant level of output. Parenthetically, one might note that some observers hâve argued that increases in productivity in fact resuit from such arrangements.
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The purpose of this paper is to.examine some of the reasons why worksharing has been so slow in coming. The main contention is that the factors noted above hâve militated against worksharing arrangements even though, in some circumstances, they would hâve advantages over layoffs. As a policy measure, worksharing makes most sensé where decreased production is temporary, for example a cyclical downturn. It is a transitional measure and is not appropriate in situations where an industry is declining and structural labour force adjustment is required. Where permanent réductions are required, other programs, such as adjustment assistance, are more appropriate. 3 * CROWLEY, R.W., Director General, Central Analytical Services, Canada Department of Labour. ** I am indebted to Tony Wohlfarth for substantial assistance in preparing this paper. An earlicr version was presented to the annual meetings of the Canadian Industrial Relations Institute, London, Ontario, May 1978. Besides increased productivity, if in fact such an increase occurs, a worksharing program has three benefits. From the employer viewpoint, it facilitâtes the rétention of a skilled labour force, and hence reduces recruitment and training costs when conditions improve. Second, it minimizes the incidence of total layoff and hence the resulting hardship among employées affected. Third, some would see decreased expenditures on unemployment insurance as an advantage.
Récent amendments to the Unemployment Insurance Act remove some of the institutional barriers which previously inhibited the introduction of worksharing arrangements. Under Section 37, introduced in 1977, the Commission is empowered to establish régulations for the opération of a pilot worksharing program. Once a worksharing agreement has been approved, récipients are eligible for unemployment insurance benefits at the regular rate of 66 2/3% of insurable earnings for those days off the job. Unlike regular benefits, no waiting period is imposed on récipients. Moreover, should total layoff follow a period of a worksharing, regular unemployment insurance entitlement is unaffected. (Benefit levels in such situations, however, may be lowered because the earnings basis for calculating benefits could be lower.)
In effect, Section 37 acts as an exemption from normal unemployment insurance provisions regarding partial employment. Under thèse regular provisions, an employée working greater than two thirds of normal hours would be disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits.
As of October 1978, twenty-two worksharing agreements had been signed. Only one involved a permanent réduction in work force. The average duration of the agreements is 21 weeks though three hâve exceeded the 26 week maximum set out in the régulations. 2400 workers hâve been or are on worksharing and it is estimated about 800 workers otherwise would hâve been laid off. In many ways this tentative and flexible first step has probably been a very good way to proceed.
EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
There is no doubt a lesson to be learned from European expérience with worksharing. It is not possible hère to provide a detailed examination but a few points of comparison can be drawn. Government sponsored worksharing programs in western Europe ail specify a maximum duration. Limits range from a low of 8 weeks in France to just under a year in the worksharing program recently introduced in the United Kingdom. In ail thèse countries worksharing is perceived as a substitute for unemployment insurance. Italy, for example, offers relatively low unemployment benefits, but pays worksharing benefits to provide those on short-time with 80% of their former gross earnings. Workshanng is most prévalent in West Germany. During their 1975 recession, 775,000 received thèse benefits, resulting in an estimated réduction of 170,000 persons from the ranks of the unemployed -équivalent to .$% decrease in the unemployment rate. Using such programs inevitably leads to abuses, and this is an area where one can perhaps learn most. One example well documented in Italy is where short-time workers "moonlight" with other part-time jobs. It is obviously difficult to police a System where the incentive may be that earnings with benefits exceed previous earnings. However, this problem may not be extensive if layoffs occur when there is a gênerai recession and employment is difficult to find. Another abuse has been for employers to take advantage of government sponsored worksharing either to permanently reduce their work force or to avoid payroll costs for some workers who would not otherwise be laid off. For example, the services of highly skilled workers may be retained in anticipation of an upturn, even without worksharing incentives. Similarly, it may be easier to "layoff" an employée if an employer knows the government will provide support over an extended period of time. Obviously, thèse "leakages" are difficult to detect.
WORKSHARING IN COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
Although government-sponsored worksharing programs are novel in Canada, the concept is not entirely alien. In 341 collective agreements involving more than 500 employées in Canadian manufacturing in 1976, 18 per cent made provision for the distribution of work during slack periods.
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In gênerai, thèse clauses require union and management consultation (that is, they are optional) and specify a minimum period prior to an individual being laid-off completely. They are most prévalent in the textile, clothing, and knitting industries -indicating, perhaps, the significant variability of work volume in those industries. There is also tendency for them to be more common in the larger bargaining units -possibly indicating greater awareness of worksharing as an alternative.
The incidence of thèse clauses tells us nothing about their actual usage, however, and in fact the statistics may be misleading. A U.S. study found 6For a discussion of work-sharing as a policy measure to reduce unemployment, see S.A. LEVITAN and R.S. BELOUS, "Reduced Worktime -Tool to Fight Unemployment", Worklife, Vol. 3, No. 4, April, 1978. 7 Ottawa: Labour Canada, 1977. that where worksharing and seniority provisions co-exist, the former are rarely used.
Provisions in Major Collective Agreements Covering Employées in Canadian Manufacturing industries,
8 A further indication of this is the frequency of severance payments and supplementary unemployment benefit clauses in contracts. Thèse payments essentially "sweeten the pot" for those laid-off by supplementing unemployment insurance benefits. Some 58% of the 341 large collective agreements cited above provided for either severance or supplementary payments.
The incidence of seniority-on-layoff provisions is still another indicator. Fully 95% of the 341 agreements required that seniority and/or related skill requirements be taken into account in the event of layoff. This is a clear indication of the important rôle played by the seniority system in protecting job security in the unionized sector. Reflecting management concern with protecting their flexibility, four-fifths of thèse agreements required considération of both skill and seniority in considering layoffs.
ARGUMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN USED AGAINST WORKSHARING
Briefs presented to the Parliamentary Committee examining the Act to amend the Unemployment Insurance Act provide some valuable insight into the principal objections to the worksharing concept. First, it was argued that worksharing would undermine the collective bargaining process. From the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) brief:
If collective agreements freely made are in force or under negotiations worksharing as envisaged hère could well represent an instrusion into the collective bargaining process.
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The Canadian Chamber of Commerce stated in its written brief that:
Collective bargaining agreements are tailored to what the parties believe are matters of substance, and layoff policy is one of thèse matters. n More forcefully, in its oral brief, the Chamber argued that they prefer to hâve employer-employées discussing an arrangement without involving the Unemployment Insurance Commission (now CEIQ.12
Union briefs generally reflected concern that worksharing would weaken worker benefits. Again from the CLC submission:
Not only would ail hands hâve to work for less than their normal earnings but pension plans and other fringe benefits already in place would suffer a dépréciation in dollar value.
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The United Auto Workers were concerned that worksharing would be bénéficiai to the employer, and at the same time mask the true dimensions of the unemployment problem:
We are totally opposed to work-sharing programs. Such programs historically tend to subsidize employers. They also give the illusion that the unemployment problem is eased when in fact it is only being shared more evenly by working people.
14 The argument that worksharing would be a subsidy was also made by management organizations, though in a différent form. The Canadian Construction Association posed the question as follows:
What care is to be exercised to ensure that the program does not simply put off the day of wrenching adjustments required for the enterprise to compete sucessfully in the market place?
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The Canadian Manufacturers Association concurred, saying that "the scheme could be used to subsidze inefficient businesses." Management représentatives also argued that worksharing would raise labour costs, since fringe benefits would hâve to be maintained and the sharing of work would imply a loss of specialization and, therefore, a drop in productivity. From the brief by the Employer's Council of British Columbia:
If such a program were instituted, in many cases there would be a lowering of the efficiency level of the opération because jobs cannot easily be broken down into a direct ratio between numbers and skills required... A second major objection to this program is that the employer would incur higher overhead costs. If employées were to be kept on payroll, even though their wages would be supplemented by the government employers would be required to maintain employée benefits.
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There is an apparent inconsistency between claims that worksharing both subsidizes and increases labour costs. It is a subsidy only in the sensé that it facilitâtes the rétention of a workforce which would otherwise be laid-off. It increases labour costs since most agreements signed to date require the employer to maintain full "fringe" benefits for ail employées. The Émployment and Immigration Commission views this, probably correctly, as an expenditure in lieu of the higher costs of future recruiting if total layoffs were instituted.
